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Abstract
We study the long run e¤ects of transparency in a circular town
model of a di¤erentiated market. The market is not fully transparent
on the consumer side: A fraction of consumers are uninformed about
prices. Increasing transparency reduces the equilibrium price, prot
and entry of rms. This improves welfare. If consumerstransporta-
tion cost is high, it also improves the average utility of consumers.
When transportation costs are very small, the fully transparent mar-
ket features cut throat competition if there are several rms in the
market, and if rms choose pure entry strategies only one rm enters
and acts like a monopolist. Consumers therefore prefer that market
transparency is as high as possible under the restriction that the market
should allow entry for two rms. If rms choose mixed entry strategies,
consumers prefer full transparency.
Keywords: Market transparency, product di¤erentiation, product
variety, competition policy
JEL: L13, L15, L40
1 Introduction
The advent of the internet and the price-comparison sites has reinvigorated
the interest in understanding how consumers information about prices  
the transparency of the market on the consumer side - a¤ects market out-
comes. This paper focusses on the long run e¤ects of transparency on the
consumer side when goods are horizontally di¤erentiated. In the long run,
transparency may inuence product variety, as rmsdecisions to enter mar-
kets depend on the competitive environment. This raises the issues whether
transparency promotes product variety, and whether it is good or bad for
consumers and general welfare. These issues are considered in a circular
town model of a di¤erentiated market with costly entry as in Salop (1979).
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comments and suggestions.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK 1455
Copenhagen K. cs@econ.ku.dk, www.econ.ku.dk/CSchultz
1
We identify market transparency with the fraction of consumers who
are informed about prices - following the lead of Varian (1980). In equi-
librium, uninformed consumers have correct expectations about prices, still
they play an important role, since rms know that these consumers rely on
expectations and not actual knowledge of prices; and this a¤ects the demand
elasticity when rms contemplate di¤erent prices.
Increasing market transparency increases rmsdemand elasticities and
thus intensies competition, so that prices and prots are lowered, this ben-
ets consumers. But it also reduces entry into the market, which lowers
the number of varieties o¤ered and reduces competition, this hurts con-
sumers. On balance, however, if the transportation cost is su¢ ciently high,
i.e. consumers are picky in their preferences on product variety, the e¤ect
of the intensied competition dominates, and average consumer welfare is
increased. Total welfare is also increased as the total entry costs are reduced
as well.
When the transportation cost is low, i.e. consumers are less picky; there
is no pure strategy equilibrium to the rmspricing game. A complete char-
acterization of the equilibrium for all transportation cost levels has not been
obtained, but results can be obtained when the consumerstransportation
cost approaches zero, so the situation approaches the homogeneous market.
In this case, competition becomes very intense under full transparency, and
if rms choose pure entry strategies, only one rm will enter in equilibrium.
For the social planner, this is optimal, transportation costs are approxi-
mately zero and the xed entry cost is not doubled. For consumers the
situation di¤ers: As long as there are more rms in the market, an increase
in transparency is pro-competitive and leads to lower prices, beneting the
consumers. But the fully transparent market features only one rm entering,
and this rm chooses the monopoly price. When rms choose pure entry
strategies, consumersmost preferred level of transparency exactly allows
two rms to enter the market in equilibrium.
As discussed by Dixit and Stigler (1986) one may discuss whether pure
strategy or mixed strategy equilibria are most reasonable for entry games.
As is well known, see e.g. Andersson and Enger (2007), mixed strategy
equilibria in entry games do not allow closed form solutions when there
are many rms. Rather than relying on numerical simulations, I consider
the case where two rms choose a mixed entry strategy. In the symmetric
equilibrium, more transparency leads to less expected entry but also lower
prices when two rms happen to enter. The consumerspreferred level of
transparency trades o¤ these two e¤ects and as it turns out, the price e¤ect
is most important and consumers prefer full transparency.
Transparency and product di¤erentiation has been touched upon before.
Most closely related to the present paper is Schultz (2004) where I study
the e¤ect on product di¤erentiation in a Hotelling model with two rms,
where uninformed consumers are uninformed about prices as well as rms
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locations. It is shown that increasing transparency reduces product di¤er-
entiation and is welfare improving. Various other models consider rms
location choices in environments of imperfect consumer information, see for
instance Stahl (1982), Wolinsky (1984), Dudey (1990), Fischer and Harring-
ton (1996), Bester (1998). These papers do not consider the decision to enter
the market. Another group of papers consider choice of price and quality
when consumers have imperfect information, see Chan and Leland (1982),
Dranove and Satterthwaite, (1992) and Armstrong and Chen (2007). Boone
and Potters (2002) consider the case where some consumers are unaware of
all existing products. In the present paper, transparency is an exogenous
feature of the model, a literature has studied the case where information
about prices and products are provided through advertising by the rms
(among others Butters (1977), Grossman-Shapiro (1984), and Bester and
Petrakis (1995)). More transparency on the producer side is typically seen
as anti-competitive as it facilitates collusion, see Kuhn and Vives (1995).
Schultz (2005) shows that transparency on the consumer side makes tacit
collusion harder.
2 The model
We consider a di¤erentiated market a la Salop (1979) where consumers and
rms are located on a circle with circumference one. A large number of
potential rms with outside opportunity zero can enter the market at a cost
of f: Firms in the market are located equidistantly. There is a continuum of
consumers. A consumer buys at most one unit of the (di¤erentiated) good.
If she buys at the price p from a rm, located x away from her, her utility
is
V = u  p  tx; (1)
where u > 0 is the reservation price, and the parameter t > 0 is the trans-
portation cost, reecting the "pickiness" of the consumer. With n rms in
the market, the distance between two neighboring rms is 1=n: A consumer
located between rms i and j is indi¤erent between buying from the rms,
if she her distance to i is
x (pi; pj) =
1
2n
+
pj   pi
2t
:
There are two information types of consumers: only a fraction, ; is informed
about the rmsprices. This is common knowledge, and thus known by the
rms. The parameter  is our measure of transparency. Both informa-
tion types are uniformly distributed on the circle. Consumers know rms
locations.
An uninformed consumer expects rm i0s price to be pei : She can only
visit one rm, and can therefore not learn all prices by visiting all rms before
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purchase. If the distance to rm i is x; the expected utility from buying from
rm i is u pei  tx:We focus on symmetric equilibria, where all rms charge
the same price. This is expected by the uninformed consumers so they buy
from the nearest rm. To avoid treating many di¤erent cases, we assume
that the market is covered. Hence, each rm will get the demand from half
of the uniformed consumers located in between it and its neighbors.
If the two rms neighboring rm i charge the same price p i; the total
demand facing rm i will be
D (pi; p i; ; n) = 

1
n
+
p i   pi
t

+
1  
n
:
The timeline is as follows: First rms decide whether to enter the market.
Then rms in the market set prices, which are observed by a fraction  of
the consumers. The uninformed consumers form expectations. Consumers
then decide which rm to buy from (if any). Finally transactions take place.
3 When transportation costs are high
First we assume that transportation costs are high, i.e. consumers are picky:
t  max
"
4 (1  )2  
2 +   22 u
2
f
; 4f
#
: (2)
As will be clear, the rst condition ensures that the rmsprice strategies
are pure and the second that at least two rms enter the market.1.
We solve the model backwards (for perfect Bayesian equilibria). When n
rms have entered, each rm maximizes (gross) prot, i; given other rms
prices, p i: For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs are constant and
normalize them to zero. Firm i0s problem is
max
pi
i = max
pi
piD (pi; p i; ; n) :
In a symmetric equilibrium pi = p i; and the equilibrium price and gross
prot full
p (; n) =
t
n
;  (; n) =
t
n2
:
More rms and higher transparency give lower equilibrium price and prot.
First, we consider pure entry strategies. Then the number of rms is
determined such that the gross prot equals the entry cost f: Hence, the
1The term 4(1 )
2
(2+ 2)2
is bell shaped, equal to 0 at  = 0 and at  = 1; and its max
value is 0.12.
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equilibrium number of rms n () is2
n () =
r
t
f
: (3)
An increase in transparency reduces protability and fewer rms enter. The
solution is only valid, if at least two rms are in the market, (n ()  2);
which requires that the second part of (2) is fullled.
If the transportation cost is low, this equilibrium may not be viable,
since the equilibrium prot is low, and it may be a better option for a rm to
charge a high price u  t2n and only sell to the uninformed consumers arriving
in equilibrium3. Hence, the equilibrium is only valid if t
n2
 1 n
 
u  t2n

:
Inserting n () gives the rst part of (2).
The equilibrium price at the equilibrium number of rms is
p () = p (; n ()) =
s
tf

; (4)
which is clearly decreasing in : Thus increasing transparency lowers the
price even when the e¤ects on product variety and the number of rms are
taken into account.
A social planner would prefer a number of rms, which minimizes the
sum of entry costs and transportation costs:
min
n
nf + 2n
Z 1
2n
0
txdx;
which gives
ns =
1
2
r
t
f
:
As   1 this is less than the number of rms entering the market in the
decentralized solution. As an increase in transparency decreases entry it
benets the social planner. He thus prefers full transparency, s = 1:
Increasing transparency a¤ects consumers through two channels: They
gain since prices are lowered, but are hurt by higher transportation costs
since fewer rms enter. The net e¤ect on consumers average utility, V ;
2To be precise, the number of rms entering the market is the integer part of
p
t= (f):
For ease of notation, we disregard integer problems, when no confusion is possible.
3We assume that transportation cost is not sunk when an uninformed consumer visits
a rm (so a geographical interpretation of the model is not valid). Hence the consumer
in the middle buys i¤ u  t=2n: It is easy to check that it is not better for rms to charge
an even higher price than u  t=2n:
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from an increase in transparency is (using (1))
@ V
@
=  @p
@
 
@

2n ()
R 1
2n()
0 txdx

@
=

1
2
  1
8

t

r
t
f
 > 0;
as  < 1: Hence, consumersaverage utility increases with transparency. As
the rms are moving around on the circle when the number changes (they
are located equidistantly) a change in transparency is not necessarily Pareto
better.
4 The almost homogeneous market
When consumers are not picky, (transportation costs are low), the rst part
of (2) is not fullled and there is no pure strategy equilibrium to the rms
pricing game. As shown by Varian (1980) for a homogeneous market, the
equilibrium then involves mixed strategies at the pricing stage. Schultz
(2005) characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in a Hotelling
model, where two rms are located at the end of the interval [0,1]. The
characterization does not allow closed form solutions, but it is shown (in
Lemma 1) that in the limit as the transport cost t tends to zero; the expected
prot of each rm approaches (1  )u=2: This is the expected prot from
selling at the monopoly price to the uninformed consumers only and sharing
the market. This was also shown by Varian for the homogeneous market.4
A straightforward adaption of the proof of Lemma 1 in Schultz (2005) shows
that this also holds when n rms share the market as here. Therefore the
expected prot of the rms in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
with n rms approaches;
E0 (n) =
1  
n
u (5)
as t! 0: The result is intuitive: It is always an option for a rm to charge the
reservation price, which equals u when transportation costs vanish, and only
serve the uninformed consumers arriving. In a mixed strategy equilibrium,
each price in the support of the distribution must give same expected prot,
and hence the expected prot is given by (5):
When n  2; the equilibrium number of rms, n0 () ; is determined by
the condition that expected gross prots equal the entry cost, therefore5
n0 () = (1  ) u
f
: (6)
4See Kühn and Rimler (2007) for a more general analysis of comparative static results
on tacit collusion when di¤erentiated product markets approach homogeneous markets.
5Again we ignore integer problems.
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The number of rms is decreasing in transparency. This solution is only valid
if n0 ()  2: If n0 () < 2 there is no equilibrium, where rms choose pure
entry strategies and more than one rm enters. If u > f; an equilibrium with
pure entry strategies exist in which a single rm enters, becomes monopolist
and charge u to all consumers. If f > u, the market is not viable.
In the limiting homogeneous market, the social planner prefers exactly
one rm, hence if
n0 () = (1  ) u
f
 2 and u > f;
an increase in transparency is preferred by the social planner.
For consumers the situation is di¤erent. In the fully transparent market,
there is one rm charging the monopoly price u:When the market is not fully
transparent a rms expected prot is given by (5) and the total expected
prot is (1  )u: The total sale equals one, so the expected price is pe =
(1  )u < u: This is independent of the number of rms! Accordingly,
consumers prefer an increase in transparency as long as this leads to more
than one rm. The optimal degree of transparency for the consumers fulls
n0 () = 2; i.e.
c = 1  2f
u
:
So, the consumers do not prefer full transparency.
5 Mixed strategies at the entry stage
As noted by Dixit and Shapiro (1986), one can discuss whether pure strategy
or mixed strategies are most reasonable in entry games. In this section,
therefore, we solve for a mixed strategy equilibrium at the entry stage. With
many rms closed solutions are not available, as the expected prot from
entering includes a binomial term, when many rms are mixing, see Dixit
and Shapiro (1986), Vettas (2006) and Anderson and Enger (2007). Rather
than resorting to numerical solutions, we consider the case of two potential
entrants playing the same mixed strategy. (An interpretation is that the
other potential entrants have chosen the pure strategy to stay out).
If the other rm chooses to enter with probability ; rm i0s expected
prot from entering is
(1  )u+ 1  
2
u  f:
In equilibrium this equals the payo¤ from staying out, 0; which implies
 = 2
u  f
u (1 + )
;
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from which we see that the entry probability is decreasing in transparency.
From the consumerspoint of view this feature of increasing transparency is
bad. On the other hand, increasing transparency decreases the price when
both rms enter, which is good. A consumers expected utility is
2 (u  ((1  )u)) + 2 (1  ) (u  u) + (1  )2 0 = 2u:
And the consumerspreferred level of transparency is therefore, cm = 1:
Hence, consumers prefer a fully transparent market, even though it gives
the lowest possible probability for two rms entering the market.
The social planner trades o¤ the probability of having too much entry,
such that entry costs are doubled, with the probability of having no entry,
such that no surplus is generated in the market. His utility is
2 (u  2f) + 2 (1  ) (u  f) + (1  )2 0:
Maximizing with respect to  yields s = 1: Hence, the social planner still
prefers full transparency when rms choose a mixed entry strategy.
6 Concluding remarks
Transparency on the consumer side a¤ects the competitiveness of a market.
In this paper we have shown that when one accounts for the long run e¤ects
on product variety and entry, full transparency is always welfare maximizing.
Consumers like high transparency as it makes the market more competitive.
This reduces product variety, and as long as there are more than one rm
in the market - or rms play mixed entry strategies- consumers prefer more
transparency to less. If rms choose pure entry strategies, there is an optimal
level of transparency for consumers, which exactly allows two rms to enter.
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